Cleodie Rickard is trade campaign manager at Global Justice Now, a UK-based organisation working for a global economy where people come before profit.  

“Critical minerals” is a buzzword in discussions about the green transition. But across industry reports, NGO communications and the media, the same claim is repeated: achieving net zero “inevitably means more mining”. Rarely is it backed with evidence.  

In this context, campaigners opposing extractive harm – mostly in the Global South, often on Indigenous lands – are frequently misconstrued as opposing climate action. Meanwhile, mining companies claim a social licence to ramp up mining, framing themselves as planetary saviours.  

Amid rising geopolitical tensions, the fog of war is clearing the greenwash: governments are increasingly justifying their scramble for minerals in terms of defence and ‘national security’. This lays bare how “critical minerals” is a political rather than a scientific term, defined differently relative to countries’ interests. It can therefore be contested. 

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To cut through the noise, we need a clearer picture of the specific industries different minerals serve – and in what amounts. And, crucially, the public must decide what kind of transition we are needing to resource. 

Our new research at Global Justice Now examines the UK’s list of 33 minerals defined as “critical”. Using International Energy Agency (IEA) data, we analysed how much of each mineral’s current production is used for green technologies – or other ends – and how much is needed to meet the IEA’s 2040 transition scenario.  

We found that one in five of these minerals play no role in the IEA’s green pathway. Another 15 – almost half – would require only a small proportion of current global production by 2040, suggesting their ‘criticality’ is not driven by green goals.  

Only seven minerals require significant uplifts – and mostly for electric vehicles (EVs), not energy generation. The defence and aerospace sector is after five of the UK’s non-transition minerals and eight transition-relevant ones. 

This raises important questions. Do we need a mining boom? Should the military sector be getting priority access to those minerals that are in high demand for green goals? Should the transition rely on a model of private EV ownership? 

Mining for transition minerals can be responsible with joint push, experts say

Political choices shape material needs. Our research suggests renewable goals can largely be met within existing mineral production, if we make small reallocations of supply across sectors – slicing the mineral pie differently, rather than growing it.  

Instead, the UK government has announced financing for mineral importers to specifically benefit “defence, aerospace and EV battery makers”, and a £6-billion ($8bn) increase in annual defence spending.

Wind turbines, not bombs  

Instead of pouring public money into weapons with a hollow claim of growth and jobs, the moment demands a proactive green industrial strategy.  

Given the mineral-intensiveness of EVs, we need improved public transport, shared mobility and less car-centric planning. For grid storage, we need research into things like pumped hydro and flow batteries – which must be government-led and well-funded, with knowledge held in the public domain rather than enclosed by corporations to tout false solutions. 

Does the world need a global treaty on energy transition minerals?

Instead, the defence sector is not only competing with the green industry for minerals but is becoming the sole darling of industrial policy. As Co