Ana Yang is Director of the Environment and Society Centre at Chatham House. 

In recent months, Brazil has been portrayed by the media, activists and other commentators as either angel or devil.

On the one hand, the country that houses 60% of the Amazon rainforest and an enormous wealth of biodiversity is touted as a climate champion, progressive host of the next UN climate talks, the potential saviour of multilateralism.  

On the other, the fifth-largest and seventh-most populous country in the world is demonised as hypocritical for pursuing oil exploration and production, investing in agriculture as a key export industry, and – most recently – building a new road on the outskirts of the northeastern city of Belem, which will host the COP30 UN climate summit in November.  

As a Brazilian working and living in London, this is a deeply familiar and frustrating story of a developing nation that cannot be trusted to act in its own interests on climate change, nor in those of the world. It is a story that holds low- and middle-income countries to different standards from rich ones, and denies them the same rights and routes to development.  

Oil production supports development

Recent criticism of Brazil’s decision to join the oil producers club, OPEC+, and of President Lula’s support for a new oil project typify this gleeful tendency to attack pragmatic leadership and deny political complexity. Such criticism is not only condescending, but counterproductive and short-sighted.  

By joining OPEC+ Brazil – with only 4% of global oil production and less than 2% of global trade oil – gets to be part of the club of countries that dictates oil prices. Crude oil is Brazil’s main export commodity, with China its main customer. Joining OPEC+ is a geopolitical move by a middle power designed to support commercial interests and trade diversification.  

The Amazon rainforest emerges as the new global oil frontier 

Of course, rapid decarbonisation is imperative if the world is to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, as per the Paris Agreement. But just as other countries scramble to balance climate goals against other policy objectives, including the opportunities of investment in fossil fuels, or provision of infrastructure, so too should Brazil be able to determine its own path to net zero. 

Brazil, a country at the forefront of the climate crisis, whose wealth is concentrated in its abundant natural resources, knows full well the importance of a managed fossil-fuel phase-out. The climate transition and decarbonisation is owned at the highest political level. The country already generates over 90% of its electricity from renewable sources, and has per capita emissions well below the global average.  

But President Lula was also elected on a promise of addressing the deep inequality, poverty, hunger and other challenges affecting the Brazilian population. Oil production and exploration contribute to the national coffers and help pay for the national health service, anti-poverty initiatives, and climate adaptation actions.  

If we genuinely want to support and encourage progress, we cannot expect Brazil to forgo its biggest commodity overnight. Instead we need an approach which acknowledges that policy-making is a game of balancing competing demands.  

No one-size-fits-all path to decarbonisation

Indeed, the truth is that, with three quarters of its emissions coming from deforestation and agriculture, Brazil’s decarbonisation challenge lies less in oil production and more in land use. To effect an equitable and low-carbon transition, the country will need to move away from a deforestation-based agriculture production